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States could have done to prevent this end result. The Chinese
people simply saw their interests better served with Mao. After
1949, the U.S. was hesitant in formally recognizing the PRC
because of the support for Chiang by many in government office
and because of a sense of mistrust toward Mao and the Communists.2 During the Korean War that began in 1950, relations
between the United States and the PRC deteriorated as the
Communists intervened to help the North Koreans, pushing back
American and United Nations forces to the Thirty-eighth Parallel.
This confrontation with the PRC garnered more support for the
Nationalists on Formosa, as the United States saw the antiAmerican Mao as the enemy.
The Republican Party regained the Presidency in 1952 with
World War II hero Dwight David Eisenhower as their nominee.
Once elected, he promised not to recognize “Red China” under
current conditions, hoping to isolate the PRC. Later American
involvement in the Vietnam War to contain the spread of Communism harmed relations between the two countries further. The fact
that Vice President Richard Nixon, as early as 1954, believed that
the PRC was backing the Vietnamese Communists by providing
them military supplies, made the possibility of rapprochement even
more distant.3
In his October 1967 Foreign Affairs article entitled “Asia After
Vietnam,” Nixon hinted at the need for the United States to better
relations with China in the future, but only after it changed its
aggressive policies. In the conclusion of the article, Nixon
explained his view on U.S. policy toward China: “For the long run,
it means pulling China back into the world community—but as a
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In the Cold War era, the United States faced challenges from two
Communist giants: the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). The United States considered both nations to be a
threat to international stability, but had failed to significantly
improve relations with these countries in the 1950s and 1960s.
While the United States was already engaging in talks with the
Soviet Union at this time, it had failed to even recognize the
existence of the PRC for over twenty years. President Nixon and
his advisor Henry A. Kissinger devised a grand plan to normalize
relations with the PRC while continuing to better relations with the
Soviet Union. Although such a strategy succeeded to some degree
in the immediate aftermath of the event, in the long run, the Soviet
Union had more pressing reasons for improving relations with the
United States. What initiated this change in policy? Because the
Chinese and Soviets were hostile toward one another, Nixon and
Kissinger sought rapprochement with the PRC mainly to gain more
leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union.
In October 1949, the Chinese Communists, led by Mao Tsetung, proclaimed victory for the new People’s Republic of China
over the United States-supported Nationalists.1 The Nationalists’
leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to Formosa (Taiwan), establishing
the Republic of China on this island. While the Republicans
blamed Truman and the Democrats for having “lost” China to the
Communists, in fact, there really was not much that the United
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great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.”4
How could Nixon advocate such a policy toward the Communists? First, Nixon had a history of being firmly anti-communist.
Not only was he a charter member of the “Who Lost China Club?”,
but he was also a steadfast realist who recognized the importance
of balance of power and geopolitical stability.5 This position
allowed him to work towards future relations with China without
seeming “soft” on Communism when he was elected President in
1968. Nixon also was a Republican and therefore able to exploit
the idea that the Democrats “lost” China. If a Democratic president had shown signs of wanting to improve relations between the
two countries, he would be seen as trying to appease the Communists. Nixon, on the other hand, would just be trying to work with
the situation that the Democrats left him. Thus, President Nixon
had the right political position to make rapprochement with the
PRC even possible.
A complimentary asset to Nixon in his hope for better relations
with China was Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and later Secretary of State. Kissinger
was a true believer in peace through stability and longed for order
in the world.6 In the Cold War era, Kissinger had two main
strategies to achieve his goal of stability: détente and linkage
diplomacy, which worked hand-in-hand. As defined by Kissinger,
détente was “the search for a more constructive relationship with
the Soviet Union.”7 It was more broadly used to describe the
relaxation of tensions between hostile countries, including
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Communist China. Kissinger saw détente as something imperative
in the age of nuclear power, when each side could potentially
destroy the other.8 Détente, however, was not about coming to
agreement on ideological values. Instead, the goal was to come to
peace without compromising the vital interests of either nation
involved.
In order to achieve détente between two nations, Kissinger
believed that linkage between issues was necessary. This strategy,
known as linkage diplomacy, involved moving talks along with the
Soviet Union on arms control while settling political differences at
the same time. Thus, the strategy was essentially the idea that
progress in one area was dependent on progress in other areas. At
one of Nixon’s first presidential press conferences as President, he
enunciated the concept of linkage as having “strategic arms talks”
in such a way as to promote “progress on outstanding political
problems at the same time,” especially on “problems in which the
United States and the Soviet Union can serve the cause of peace.”9
Kissinger’s linkage approach dealt with issues in the global
sense, not just as isolated events. Issues could not just be compartmentalized, for Kissinger believed that the Soviet Union would
then use cooperation in one area while simultaneously trying to get
the upper hand elsewhere.10 This policy would create both
incentives and negative consequences for Soviet action, so that in
the end, the Soviet Union would be led to détente with the United
States.11 The ultimate end of the linkage strategy was to make both
United States and Soviet policy in line with the realities of the
world situation. Most Americans, however, saw linkage diplomacy as just the Administration’s way of stalling arms limitations
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talks with the Soviet Union.12 Nevertheless, when Nixon and
Kissinger saw the rise of China as threatening global stability, the
policies of détente and linkage were used to normalize relations.
On July 23, 1969, President Nixon articulated what came to be
known as the Nixon Doctrine. This statement limited the extent of
U.S. involvement in Asia in order to ensure that there would be no
future situations like Vietnam.13 The United States would respect
its existing treaty obligations, but it would not make any more
commitments in the area unless essential to American interests. In
addition, the United States would issue arms and money to help
Asian nations fight aggression, but it would be the responsibility
of the country to provide the manpower necessary to fight. There
was one main exception to the aforementioned conditions: if an
ally was threatened by a nuclear power, referring to the Soviet
Union or the PRC, the United States would be compelled to act
directly.14 Thus, although the United States saw the trouble in
further involvement in Asia after the Vietnam War, it was not
ready to totally remove itself from Asia, where the two largest
Communist states were located.
Was there a higher purpose than solely to limit United States
involvement in Asia at work in the Nixon Doctrine? International
relations expert Robert Litwak argus that one of the keys to the
Nixon Doctrine was in détente with both China and the Soviet
Union. If the United States could normalize relations with these
two countries, then the Asian continent would be more stable in
terms of United States interests, and the U.S. could start to transfer
its power to its ally nations in the area.15 As long as the United
States and China were enemies, it was not likely that the United
States would surrender significant interest in Asia even if the
Nixon Doctrine outlined such a position. Therefore, one reason for

Historical Perspectives

the beginning of Sino-American rapprochement under Nixon was
that it flowed logically from the Nixon Doctrine and provided
stability in Southeast Asia.
Nixon and Kissinger had other motivations in seeking to
normalize relations between the United States and the PRC after
over twenty years of non-recognition and hostility. Nixon clearly
stated the obvious reason that better relations were “certainly in
our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and
the world.”16 Just as détente with the Communist Soviet Union
was beneficial to maintaining peace during the Cold War, détente
with the PRC would provide similar results, especially after U.S.Sino conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Therefore, rapprochement
simply for the sake of better relations was an important consideration. The sheer size of mainland China was another factor. The
existence of a 3.7 million square mile expanse of land with
approximately 750 million people could not be ignored or isolated
politically and economically.17 President Nixon, speaking in
Kansas City explained, “Mainland China, outside the world
community, completely isolated, with its leaders not in communication with world leaders, would be a danger to the whole world
that would be unacceptable.”18 Although these were important
considerations, the possibility of improving relations with the
Soviet Union was the most significant cause for a United States
interest in normalization with the PRC.
There were ideological disagreements between the Soviets and
the Chinese during this time, even though both nations were
Communist. Mao Tse-tung believed Chinese Communism to be
purer than that of the Soviets, since China had achieved Communism without going through a stage of socialism.19 Another
16
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ideological contention was the Chinese accusation that the Soviet
leaders were “revisionists,” and thus the real head of the Communist revolution was Mao Tse-tung, located in the Chinese capital
of Peking.20 Mao thought the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was
too intent on peaceful relations with the West, giving up the
revolutionary aspect of Communism. Before, the United States
believed in the monolithic character of international Communism—that Communism was under control of the Soviets and
everything stemmed from their wishes. However, with the
nationalism of the Chinese Communists and open hostility with the
Soviets, this theory failed. Kissinger believed that this history of
hostility that had existed before and after the 1950s between China
and the Soviet Union would continue to exist, and thus the United
States’ policies had to adjust to this new world power structure.
Kissinger’s idea to stabilize the world order in this era of the
Sino-Soviet split involved what political scientists call “triangular
diplomacy,” a branch of linkage diplomacy. Triangular diplomacy
was the concept that the interests of the United States were best
served if it preserved better relations with both the Chinese and
Soviets than these two countries did with each other.21 The policy
“linked” progress with China to further progress with the Soviet
Union. The United States was to hold the most favorable position
in the triangle and act like a fulcrum, with the two other countries
depending on the U.S. In this way, both China and the Soviet
Union would try to gain favor with the United States against the
other country. The United States would then act as the balancer
between the two countries, establishing better relations with each
country as well as a global equilibrium in the process.22 However,
the key was not to antagonize one of the countries too much, for it

was like “walking a delicate tightrope.”23 If the United States
could achieve rapprochement with the PRC, the idea was that it
would gain huge leverage over the Soviet Union, which would lead
to greater Soviet cooperation. Plus, the Chinese had reasons to
want to seek normalization of relations with the United States. The
PRC was experiencing definite hostility with the Soviet Union, a
nation with superior military force. Would the Chinese really want
to be isolated from both the United States and the Soviet Union?
Since Kissinger believed that the Chinese feared the Soviet Union
more than the United States, reconciliation between the two Pacific
powers seemed possible.24 Thus, triangular diplomacy was based
on using continuing hostilities between the two Communist
superpowers to achieve global stability.
Once the Nixon-Kissinger strategy was established to seek
rapprochement with the PRC, a series of subtle diplomatic
exchanges traveled between Washington and Peking aimed at
showing each country’s good intentions about establishing
relations. The United States first tired to resume Sino-American
talks after a two-year break. This was achieved with talks
beginning on January 20, 1970 in Warsaw between the U.S.
Ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, and Lei Yang from the
PRC, eventually resulting in the Chinese accepting the U.S.
proposal to send a high-ranking American official to Peking to
serve as leader of the American delegation in discussions there.25
In Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress in February 1970,
the President reported, “The Chinese are a great and vital people
who should not remain isolated from the international community…But it is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace
and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can

20
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21
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22
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23
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toward improved practical relations with Peking.”26 Although the
talks between the PRC and the United States were temporarily
halted due to the American invasion of Cambodia, diplomatic
channels reopened after a couple of months.
Nixon opened up indirect channels to China through President
Yahya Khan of Pakistan and President Nicolae Ceausescu of
Romania in order to keep the State Department out of the negotiations.27 The Department of State had a large bureaucracy and was
not very secretive, which was important to Nixon and China in the
beginning of this new relationship. In another positive gesture
towards China, on October 26, 1970, Nixon actually called China
the “People’s Republic of China” instead of “Communist China.”28
After a series of messages between the White House and Chou Enlai discussing the sending of an American envoy to Peking and
identifying the main obstacle to diplomatic relations as Taiwan, a
breakthrough occurred. On April 27, 1971, a message was
received through the Pakistan channel from Chou En-lai that
stated, “The Chinese government reaffirms its willingness to
receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the
U.S. (for instance Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or
even the President of the U.S. himself for a direct meeting and
discussion.”29 The scene was now set for the United States and the
PRC to openly discuss, in person, the differences hindering
improved relations.
During the same month, the Chinese sent another signal
proving their desire for better relations. Both the Chinese and the
United States table tennis team were participating in the World
Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan. Nineteen-year-old
Glenn Cowan from Santa Monica, California, approached the
Chinese team captain to get a ride on a bus with them to see the
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pearl farms. In retrospect, Kissinger noted that such an event
never would have happened unless Mao and Chou En-lai explicitly
told the team to be nice to the Americans.30 Cowan later gave the
Chinese captain a T-shirt and he received a Chinese scarf in return.
However, what became known as ping-pong diplomacy was more
than just an exchange of gifts. The Chinese actually invited the
American team to visit on April 6, and when they arrived at the
reception that Chou En-lai arranged, he proclaimed, “You have
opened a new chapter in the relations of the American and Chinese
people.”31 An invitation was extended to the Chinese team to visit
the United States as well. Chou En-lai’s overture to the ping-pong
team was symbolic of the readiness of the Communist Chinese
government to develop relations with the United States.
After it was certain that an American official was welcome in
Peking, the question became who to send. After brainstorming for
possible candidates, Nixon decided on Kissinger, for he knew
Nixon’s policy best and the President could exert the most control
over him.32 As part of his plan, Nixon wanted his representative to
go on a secret trip to China beforehand to formally arrange the
details of the President’s trip. If the trip were secret, Nixon did not
have to worry about other countries, such as the Republic of China,
attempting to thwart the trip, wanting a list of concessions, or
making the U.S. promise not to compromise.33 In addition, the
United States was simply not familiar with China or its officials,
and, not knowing what to expect, wanted to keep this first trip
secret. Kissinger was the perfect person for a secret trip. Not only
was he furtive by nature, but he also had a reputation of being a
playboy, dating many different women, including the actresses Jill
St. John, Shirley MacLaine, Marlo Thomas, Candice Bergen, and
30
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Liv Ullmann.34 So, if he were to “disappear” for a couple to days
to go to China, no one would be surprised, imagining that he was
with a woman somewhere.
Given the codename “Polo,” after the explorer Marco Polo, the
first Westerner to travel to China, Kissinger’s trip broke the ground
for President Nixon’s visit.35 To keep the trip to China secret,
Kissinger suddenly became ill with a “stomach ache” while in
Pakistan, requiring bed rest for a couple of days.36 It was during
these days, July 9-11, 1971, that Kissinger flew to China to meet
with Chou En-lai, the foreign minister with an understanding of the
Western world. Kissinger came back from this journey with a
sense of the personality and ideology of the Chinese, especially
Chou En-lai, and had laid the groundwork for the President’s own
trip. Kissinger and Chou En-lai worked out a joint communiqué
to be issued at the end of the trip, revealing both countries’ interest
in having the President go to China for a summit and the President’s acceptance of such an invitation. In addition, the document
mentioned the purpose of the President’s trip, which was to seek
normalization of relations and to discuss “questions of concern to
the two sides.”37 This communiqué was what President Nixon read
to the American people over national television on July 15, adding
that this beginning of relations with the PRC was “not directed
against any other nation.”38 With this qualification, it appeared on
the outside that the United States was not opening up talks with the
PRC to use as leverage against the Soviet Union, although this was
exactly what the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of triangular diplomacy
was all about. By improving relations with China, Nixon and
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Kissinger hoped the Soviet Union would be more eager to work
with the U.S.
The meetings between Kissinger and Chou En-lai, however,
amounted to more than just what was read to the public. Kissinger
reported privately to the President that the Taiwan issue was still
the main impediment to normalization of relations, and that the
Chinese were still very fearful of the Soviet Union, which played
nicely into the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of triangular diplomacy. 39
The Chinese were adamant about the United States recognizing
Taiwan as part of China and removing troops from the Taiwan
Strait, but these issues would be discussed in detail later when
Nixon met with Mao Tse-tung. Nevertheless, Kissinger explained
to Chou En-lai that removal of troops from Taiwan was linked to
the conflict in Vietnam.40 Thus, if China wanted progress on the
removal of U.S. troops, progress had to be made in ending the war
in Vietnam. Besides general discussions on these issues, Chou
En-lai and Kissinger worked out the basics of the President’s trip,
including what cities to visit, how long to stay, and which Americans should attend.
Kissinger went on a second trip to Peking in October 1971, but
this time publicly, to negotiate the joint communiqué that would be
issued after the President’s journey in February 1972.41 After
wrangling by both Chou En-lai and Kissinger about the wording of
the communiqué, a document that highlighted the common
interests of both countries while also including a section where
both countries could assert their differences, was created. While
Kissinger was in China, the United Nations (UN) voted to expel
the Republic of China on Taiwan from the General Assembly,
while giving the PRC a seat on the Security Council.42 Although
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the United States had supported Taiwan remaining in the UN, the
fact that Kissinger’s trip to China coincided with the UN vote
caused many to speculate that Kissinger’s visit had caused the
outcome.
President Nixon’s historic journey to China on February 21,
1972, the first ever by an American President while in office, was
largely symbolic in nature. When President Nixon stepped off the
plane, he greeted Chou En-lai with a handshake, something
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to do in Geneva in
1954.43 With this handshake, a new era of relations between the
two countries began. The main workings of the joint communiqué
had already been finished months in advance between Kissinger
and Chou En-lai, and so all that was left to do was to complete the
details of the document. This job was basically left to Kissinger
and his foreign policy aides. Nixon spent his days in China
meeting with Chou En-lai, discussing issues of policy, sightseeing,
and attending banquets. During the few times that Nixon was able
to meet with Mao Tse-tung, they discussed Chiang Kai-shek,
American politics, world affairs, and general policy issues between
the two countries.44 What they discussed did not really matter.
The fact that these two leaders, after years of impasse, were
speaking face to face was significant by itself.
The Shanghai Communiqué, which was issued at the end of the
President’s trip, outlined what had been discussed and agreed upon
at the summit.45 The United States reaffirmed its desire for peace
both in Asia and the world, its support of the South Korea and
Japan, and its agreement with Nixon’s latest peace proposal for
Vietnam. The PRC, on the other hand, declared its support for the
struggle of oppressed people and nations, its opposition to Japan,
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and its support of North Korea and the Communist peace position
in Vietnam. On the issue of Taiwan, the United States acknowledged that Taiwan was part of China, but that it was an issue the
Chinese should deal peacefully with themselves. In time, the
United States confirmed it would remove its military presence
surrounding the country a long as “the tension in the area diminishes.”46 This last phrase shows the Nixon-Kissinger linkage
diplomacy, giving the Chinese government reason to work to end
the war in Vietnam. China also asserted that Taiwan was part of
China, but that the People’s Republic was the only government of
China.
Besides the talk of expanded trade, more regular diplomatic
communication, and exchanges of culture, the only true agreement
that came out of the communiqué was that both countries opposed
any country, including themselves, gaining hegemony in the
Asian-Pacific area. This can be seen as directed toward the
Soviets, whom the Chinese thought wanted influence in the region.
This agreement also reflects the Nixon-Kissinger desire for
stability in Asia. Essentially, the communiqué just showed that the
Chinese and the Americans agreed to disagree. Thus, the importance of President Nixon’s trip is not what came from it, but
simply that it occurred.
The question then becomes whether or not the President’s trip
was actually effective in achieving the Nixon-Kissinger goals. In
other words, did improved relations with the PRC really give the
United States an advantage in talks with the Soviets, as linkage
diplomacy suggested? In the months immediately following the
President’s announcement of his trip to Peking, Moscow did
appear to respond to the new international situation. In a July 24,
1971 article in Pravda, less than ten days after the President’s
broadcast, the Soviets commented on the new chapter in SinoAmerican relations: “It goes without saying that any designs to use
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An arms race between the two countries was occurring during this
time, making it in the Soviets’ best interests, both economically
and strategically, to work out an agreement with the United States,
sooner rather than later. In this way, the United States and the
Soviet Union would remain on nuclear parity. Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks (SALT) began to progress more rapidly after a
period of impasse even before Nixon announced that he was going
to Peking, which testifies to the fact that the Soviets were serious
in wanting improvements.50 Indirectly, Nixon’s trip could have had
an effect on Moscow’s willingness to cooperate in the later stages
of the talks, especially so soon after the historic event. Still, a
better relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States
in and of itself was probably the main motivator for the increased
Soviet cooperation.
As the United States slowly moved towards more normal
relations with China in the 1970s after Nixon’s initial trip, there is
no evidence that Soviet action was influenced as a result. The
United States continued to work mainly on arms agreements with
the Soviet Union to reduce the chances of nuclear annihilation.
During the same time, China and the United States were taking
baby steps to diplomatic relations, including the establishment of
liaison offices in Washington and Peking in 1973.51 The relationship between China and the United States was in no way resilient,
especially since the Chinese refused to establish diplomatic
relations or extensive trade with the United States until Nixon gave
up recognition of Chiang Kai-skek’s regime on Taiwan and the
1954 defense pact the United States had with him.52 Nixon was not
ready to commit himself to abandoning Taiwan, especially during
Watergate when he needed the support of conservative members
in Congress who had traditionally supported Chiang Kai-shek.
Therefore, from the Soviet perspective, although loose relations

the contacts between Peking and Washington for some ‘pressure’
on the Soviet Union…are nothing but the result of a loss of touch
with reality.”47 Although the Soviet rhetoric alluded to standing
firm, shortly thereafter, the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
indicated his desire for the President to attend a summit in
Moscow. Progress was also made in late August 1971 on Berlin,
which had been an area of contention with the Soviet Union. An
agreement was reached to limit the harassment of travelers from
East Berlin to West Berlin, allow West Berliners to travel using
West German passports, and permit a Soviet consulate to be
established in West Berlin.48 Even though the President had yet to
visit Peking, just the idea that he was going made the Soviets a
little more anxious and encouraged them to work with the United
States.
The President went to Moscow in May 1972, three months
after opening up China, to work on arms agreements. At the
Moscow summit, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of linking limits on
offensive weapons with limits on defensive agreements was
successful. The two countries agreed to limit antiballistic missiles
(ABMs), and also signed an interim offensive agreement limiting
the number of offensive weapons to those currently in existence.49
In the wake of President Nixon meeting with Chairman Mao Tsetung, the Soviets naturally became more concerned about their
relationship with the United States. They did not want to be left
alone in this new era of Sino-American cooperation. It was almost
as if Nixon’s trip to Peking shocked the Soviet Union into
compromising with the United States, at least in the short run.
However, regardless of whether or not normalization was
occurring with China, the Soviet Union needed the strategic arms
limitations with the other nuclear superpower, the United States.
47
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Watergate when he needed the support of conservative members
in Congress who had traditionally supported Chiang Kai-shek.
Therefore, from the Soviet perspective, although loose relations
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did exist between China and the United States, there were still
many issues that needed to be resolved on both sides. The idea
that the Soviet Union would feel compelled to work with the
United States because of China is not a strong argument because
it was in the Soviet Union’s best interest to cooperate with the
United States to keep nuclear power in balance.
The Nixon-Kissinger strategy of using linkage diplomacy in
order to achieve détente with the two largest Communist nations
was a great plan on paper, but in reality, not extremely successful.
Both the Soviet Union and the PRC were better off working with
the United States regardless of whether their rival Communist
country was also. The Sino-Soviet split could not hurt the United
States in improving relations with these countries, yet it had only
an indirect effect, if any, on Soviet motivations for cooperation.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Nixon’s opening of China was
beneficial. With a strong anti-communist background and a
capable national security assistant in Kissinger, Nixon was able to
begin normalization of relations with the PRC that eventually led
to full diplomatic recognition in 1979.53 The Nixon-Kissinger
strategy of using China as an incentive for Soviet cooperation was
ineffective, but the results of the policy led to a new era in SinoAmerican relations.
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